Reconstruction" that the availability of new Russian memoir material, excellent individual monographs, and large amounts of declassified material allow a more thorough understanding of the Soviet Union's "operational-political" withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan.
1 As the title of 
Background
Afghan society and culture is a complex web of tribal relationships that has historically been resistant to both a central government and foreign control. Various religious, ethnic, and tribal rifts have existed for centuries making Afghanistan a fractured violent country. Antonio
Giustozzi, a noted political scientist and expert on Afghanistan, is skeptical as to whether or not Afghanistan will ever succeed in forming a "modern" state, or anything that would be "diplomatically recognizable" in today's world.
Historical Context of Afghanistan
Historically, Afghanistan has been a geographic crossroads between massive empires.
Consequently, it is the stage on which other empires "scheme against one another." 6 For example, "The Great Game," which characterized the competing interests of the British and Russian
Empires in the 19th century, illustrates Afghan cultural resistance to foreign control. It also provides an interesting historical parallel to the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union. By 1878, the Russian Empire had expanded to the edge of present day Afghanistan.
Seeking diplomatic parity, Britain attempted to impose a diplomatic mission in Kabul along with a 40,000-man garrison. This triggered a second war in Afghanistan. The second British-Afghan war bore a striking similarity to the Cold War pattern of proxy wars in the 20th century. Neither the Russian Empire nor the British Empire had a strategic interest in Afghanistan itself other than it happened to be the geographic point through which each empire needed to impose its will on the other.
Afghanistan became a unified kingdom approximately a century prior to The Great Game. Although it was an emirate ruled by a monarchy as early as 1729, at no point in its history were its warring tribes ever truly unified under a central government. The communist movement in Afghanistan eventually emerged as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. Consistent with Afghan culture, the PDPA was in reality a loosely bound group of tribes in violent competition with one another. It was not a political party in the modern western sense. A common perception is that the PDPA was neatly split into a Pashtun camp and a Tajik Camp: Khalq and Parcham. The reality was more complex.
The various alliances and conflicts were constantly shifting to the extent that any characterization of the PDPA, Khalq, or Parcham would only be mildly accurate for a specific point in time. It is true however that the Khalqs were predominately Pashtun with rural agrarian backgrounds.
Parchams were urbanites who tended to be more educated, although they still maintained tribal affiliations and the obligatory blood feuds that came with them. The PDPA was illegal in
Afghanistan, yet King Zahir Shah seemed to favor the social and economic reforms proposed by 
Emergence of Militant Islam in Afghanistan
Virtually the entire population of Afghanistan rejected the socialist reforms of the DRA.
The DRA imposed Atheism by closing mosques, abolishing Islamic law, and encouraging men to shave their beards. Land reforms made it illegal for powerful warlords to own property. The gender reforms clashed with Afghan cultural treatment of women by requiring education and schooling for females (in the same classroom as males). It imposed a minimum age at which women could be married, prohibiting the Afghan tradition of forced child marriage. Although the attempt to liberate women was a laudable effort, even the former King Zahir Shah faced widespread rebellion when he tried to promote liberation and education for girls because it clashed with the conservative principles of the Afghan tribal system. The DRA imposed the reforms with Soviet-style brutality resulting in tens of thousands of people put to death and imprisoned. In response, the entire country rebelled. 16 Noted scholar Antonio Guistozzi stated that the causes of insurrection were different in different parts of the country. For example, some villages initially supported the reforms but then rebelled when they were forbidden to pray in the Mosque. In other places, the first announcement of land reform led straight to an explosion. See Antonio Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978-1992 capable of governance created a security dilemma too dangerous for the Soviets to ignore.
Instability on the Soviet Southern Border
The mood in Moscow favored the use of force. At a minimum, they needed to replace
Amin. Taraki's murder personally upset Brezhnev because they were close friends and he made a promise to protect him. Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, was "mortified by his department's failure to keep control of events" and advocated replacing Amin with a leader the Soviets could work with.
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The apparent impotence and powerlessness to influence events in Afghanistan A narrative commonly circulated is that nobody really knows how the Soviets decided to occupy Afghanistan or why. This is not true. In fact, the Soviet leadership debated military intervention in Afghanistan at a special Party Plenum and most of those present endorsed it. 27 The decision to intervene in Afghanistan ended up being a foreign policy disaster, but it was not irrational. Moreover, it was not an emotional knee jerk reaction by a small inner circle of geriatric Stalin-era decision makers, which is a common perception stated by authors. The decision to use force was a solution to a very real security concern, and the majority of Soviet leadership endorsed it. They understood the costs in blood and treasure. Khrushchev, vol. 6 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) , 94. For the most concise history of the Cold War, see also Gaddis.
31 Ibid., [12] [13] [14] 28 . See for example the maps of territorial changes on pages 13 and 23. The end of the Cold War was essentially a western triumph in a contest between two competing economic and political systems. The free market economy triumphed over the centrally-planned socialist economy. A common thread in nearly all countries of the post-Cold
War era is a general acceptance of a free market economy. While the collapse of the Soviet system gave rise to 15 new countries, not all of the countries became democratic, but most if not all, accepted some level of globalized capitalism in order to grow their economies. 36 Gaddis, 221, 242. Beginning in 1981, the Soviet decision not to intervene in the Solidarity movement in Poland signaled a reversal of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It was during this time the Soviet economy began to rapidly decline; while the U.S. defense budget doubled during the Reagan Administration. 37 Gaddis, 246. 38 The United States and its NATO allies never recognized the U.S.S.R. claim to the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. From the Soviet perspective, the charge that they were denying the Afghan people's right to self-determination was unfounded. The Soviets had an assistance treaty with Afghanistan, and the legitimate government of Afghanistan requested assistance. The DRA was enforcing its lawful right to govern its own people. The DRA request for Soviet assistance was not the issue.
The Afghan insurgency was the issue because external countries (including the U.S.) were interfering with Afghanistan's internal affairs by funding an insurgency.
Early Efforts to Withdraw from Afghanistan
The increasingly large body of declassified documents from the former Soviet Union and personal memoirs of former Soviet officials indicate that the Soviets recognized that their occupation of Afghanistan was a strategic blunder from the beginning. They were seeking a way out as early as 1983. 39 The two events that blocked a Soviet withdrawal in 1983 were the U.S. A churning of Soviet leadership characterized the year 1983. An opportunity to withdraw had been lost, and to complicate matters the U.S. had a firm intelligence presence in Pakistan.
There was no end in sight to stabilizing Afghanistan. Another main reason why the Soviets failed to stabilize Afghanistan quickly and withdraw in 1983 was due to failures in the operational approach to the initial invasion. Whatever their reasoning at the time, the Soviet General Staff concluded that the ethnic composition of the LCOSF was a major factor in prolonging the violence and did little to stabilize the country. As the war dragged on and Soviet forces established a rotation schedule, they became much more sensitive to the ethnic rivalries peculiar to Afghanistan. 42 It is important to note that less than 10 percent of the Soviet military ever deployed to Afghanistan. The majority of Soviet forces, including the vast majority of their elite forces, were oriented on Western Europe in preparation for a major war against the NATO alliance. 43 Neither the initial force nor followon rotational forces had the resources or expertise required because they were reserved for the European Theater.
42 Russian General Staff, 24. 43 Braithwaite, 125.
Poor Integration of Themes and Messages
The Soviets acknowledged that they lost the propaganda war. It seemed to the Soviets that the Afghan population never understood that they came to Afghanistan to help. 44 The Soviet General Staff all agree that "non-military" efforts such as economic assistance and local governance were not integrated at all into any of the nine major combat offensives they conducted between 1980 and 1986. It became obvious in retrospect that Soviet themes and messages did not convince anyone inside or outside of Afghanistan that their continued presence was benefitting anyone.
Convoluted Chains of Command
The LCSOF operated in Afghanistan under the operational control of a temporary 51 Ibid., 13, 28, 60. Released from a Kabul prison in 1979, he formed Ittehad-e-Islami-Brai-Azadi-e-Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberaton of Afghanistan). The last group had independent Saudi and Egyptian funding in addition to U.S-backed Pakistani funds. It is important to note that alliances between these organizations were temporary and only for the purpose of political expediency. Trying to describe the character of the groups in the Tanzeemat by saying one was "Pashtun-Sufi" or "moderate" or "traditional" is problematic. The best metaphor to describe them is to say they were like water. Each group took the shape of whatever container it happened to be in at that particular moment in time. However, they did have some things in common. They all agreed on the establishment of an orthodox Islamic government for Afghanistan. They all envisioned a protracted expansion of orthodox Islam beyond the Afghan borders. They all believed in de-politicizing Islam and to that end they believed that restoring the monarchy could be a reasonable way to separate Islam from state politics. The six groups that formed before the Although Pakistan never opposed the Loya Jirga, they did nothing to promote it. Simple bureaucratic inertia prevented a more unified Afghan resistance from ever materializing. Therefore, the Tanzeemat became the face of Afghan resistance.
A common perception is that the entire Afghan resistance and the Taliban problems that came later were solely a result of ISI decisions to support groups with more militant Islamic beliefs. The ISI managed the support to the Afghan resistance, but they had very broad international acceptance. Support to the Islamic Afghan resistance also came from the Non 55 Khan, [71] [72] 56 Bird and Marshall, March 1985. Gorbachev recognized that the Soviet Union was internationally isolated, and socially backward. Placing the blame for these serious issues squarely on the Soviet leadership, he introduced sweeping reform programs termed glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic restructuring). 64 The withdrawal from Afghanistan was one element of Gorbachev's overall effort to reform the Soviet Union. 65 It had nothing to do with whether or not the Soviets were successful in stabilizing Afghanistan.
Glasnost In his book Russia at the Polls: Voters, Elections, and Democratization, SAMS Professor
Dr. Christopher Marsh wrote that Gorbachev wanted to "make party and state leaders more responsive to the people's needs by opening them up to criticism". 66 The Glasnost policy required public officials to appear on radio and television programs to answer complaints from the population, and stand for competitive elections. Of the many unintended consequences of open debates about public policy, allowing the public to express its outrage over the Soviet-Afghan war was a significant factor. Moreover, the leadership could not silence the public outcry over the Soviet war in Afghanistan once it began.
Perestroika
Gorbachev's primary motivation for a firm, unambiguous, unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan stemmed from the urgent need to reform the Soviet economy. Dating back to the 64 Marsh, 35. 65 Ibid., vi; and Rogers, [7] [8] [9] [10] 66 Marsh, 35. regimes of Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Union had a very one-dimensional foreign policy based on military force. Military power was the Soviet Union's only source of international status, and it had over-extended itself. By 1980, the Soviets had to address the enormous inconsistency between domestic conditions and its superpower status. Compared to the U.S., Soviet defense spending was twice the percentage of its Gross National Product. They had an army of nearly 775,000 troops (compared to 545,000 U.S. troops), over a half million of which were stationed in Eastern Europe and 105,000 in Afghanistan. The sheer cost of its military posture was causing the entire socialist model to fail. 67 Although the cost of the military was the biggest economic factor, it was not the only factor. It was a downward spiral of several factors, each one exacerbating another. For example, the Soviet Union's main source of hard currency was petroleum, the prices of which dropped considerably in 1985. The lack of hard currency made it difficult for the Soviet Union to purchase machinery and technology for modernization. Lacking modern equipment, production of consumer goods stagnated and then declined. The shortage of consumer goods caused a decline in the standard of living, which caused public complaints within the framework of glasnost, which caused domestic instability.
Gorbachev not only sympathized with the commonly held belief that no military solution existed for the Afghan problem, but that whatever the problem was in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was not going to keep pursuing solutions indefinitely. In 1985, Gorbachev gave the LCOSF and Afghan DRA a deadline of one year to conclude major combat operations and begin withdrawal. 68 It is not clear if Gorbachev himself increased the tempo of the Afghan war, or he lacked control over the hard-line Soviets opposed to his reformist agenda. In any case, the LCOSF had nearly free reign and unlimited resources to end the Soviet Afghan war in 1985- 67 Gelman, 144.
68 Rubin, 146. 1986 . It was the bloodiest year of the Soviet-Afghan war, and it was a year of transition to withdrawal. For Gorbachev, it was obvious by 1986 that the war had serious internal and international repercussions. 69 As a result, Gorbachev demanded an unconditional withdrawal. The core of Taliban rule was enforcement of Islamic law. They made sure the local population attended the mosques for daily prayers, enforced prohibitions on TV, VCR, and satellite dishes, and made sure men's beards were of the proper length among other things. They did nothing to remove or replace the black market economy that emerged during the Soviet occupation. The Taliban were content to collect taxes on trucking fees imposed by various warlords, and on the 2,500 tons of opium exported annually from Afghanistan.
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The Taliban and its supporters envisioned Afghanistan as a base for a transnational movement that would expand orthodox Islamic governance worldwide. Therefore, from 1994 onward, the Taliban was a coalition composed of not only Afghans, but also approximately 30,000 Pakistani nationals and 3,000 other militants from a variety of Islamic countries. The
Taliban agenda dovetailed with Osama Bin Laden's vision for his transnational Islamic army.
They became so tightly integrated that, by the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Taliban and AlQaeda were one in the same. 
Implications
Afghan culture is nonetheless a major, if not central factor in the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its future stability. The historical resistance to a strong central government and foreign intervention creates a security dilemma because Afghanistan will need both in order to assure the rest of the world it is capable of denying sanctuary to international terrorists.
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan echoes many similarities to the U.S. experience two and a half decades later. The three most notable similarities are acknowledgement of the limits of military power, Afghan cultural resistance to foreign intervention, and the policy objective of making Afghanistan stable and secure. Soviet General Staff acknowledged the limits of military power and concluded by 1986 that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem. Currently in the West, a belief that continued military activity will not achieve a higher level of security in Afghanistan is gaining wider acceptance among critics of U.S. foreign policy.
Second, the Soviets underestimated local resistance to reconciling the various tribal rifts endemic 80 Cordovez and Harrison, 387. to Afghanistan. Likewise, in spite of its best efforts, the U.S. has little impact in eliminating the various warlords that govern the country or in reducing crime and corruption in the Afghan central government. Third, although the U.S. misinterpreted the Soviet intentions, both countries' strategic goal was to establish a stable and self-sufficient government in Afghanistan capable of maintaining a monopoly on violence within the country.
There is however a major difference between the Soviet experience and the U.S.
experience that would affect the operational approach. Two super-powers no longer polarize the world trying to interfere with each other's interests. With very few exceptions, nearly every country in the world supports the establishment of a stable and self-sufficient government in
Afghanistan. This very important difference has implications for the operational approach to withdrawal because it implies a worldwide consent to having an international security presence in
Afghanistan until the government is fully self-sufficient. Yet history suggests that Afghan culture will continue to resist both an international security presence and a self-sufficient central government. Whereas the Soviet fundamental interest in withdrawal was a part of Gorbachev's broader reforms, the U.S. challenge is going to be how to deliver an Afghan government that is diplomatically recognizable to the international community, represents the interests of the Afghan population, and denies safe haven to international terrorist organizations. The three goals conflict with one another because the population seems to be content with fragmented de-centralized governance, and it is either supportive or indifferent to militant Islamic movements.
